The Darfur illusion: hostilities are decreasing but no peace in sight

The security situation in Darfur can be very misleading. Since their offensives in 2015 and 2016, government forces, assisted by militias, have significantly reduced the presence of rebel movements in Darfur. This was confirmed by the Peace and Security Council (PSC) when it met on 29 March 2017 to discuss Darfur and the activities of the AU–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). At this meeting the PSC noted the improvement in the situation and called for a review of the ‘deployment [of the mission] in the context of the improved environment in Darfur’.

The offensive by the government has also deprived rebel movements of the support they received from local communities. Moreover, the changing geopolitical context, with the rapprochement between Sudan and some of its former regional foes and Western critics such as Uganda, South Sudan and the United States, has decreased the backing that rebel movements have enjoyed since 2003.

On the surface, then, things are calm. However, clashes continue, and since the violence started in 2003 no comprehensive peace agreement has been signed by all the main stakeholders.

The Darfur conflict erupted in 2003 when two rebel movements took up arms to protest against the economic and political marginalisation of their groups in Sudan at both the local and the national level.

Since then, two peace agreements have been signed, the Darfur Peace Agreement of 2006 and the Doha Document of Peace in Darfur (DDPD) of 2011. Neither of them was signed by all the rebel groups.* At this point the government still views the DDPD as the framework for any settlement. The major groups, however, reject this document and view it as being too favourable to the government.

Both parties have instead declared unilateral ceasefires on separate occasions. Since October 2015 the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) chaired by Minni Minawi, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) have all announced six-month ceasefires, renewed over time.

In June 2016 the government also declared a four-month cessation of hostilities, extended for two months in October, another month in December and recently for six months in January 2017. From the government’s perspective, these actions were necessary to convince the outgoing Obama administration to lift the 20-year-long US sanctions against Sudan.

At the local level, the situation remains volatile because of recurrent inter-communal conflicts, with clashes between ‘Arab’ militias and ‘non-Arab’ groups, ‘Arab’ militias and the government, and among ‘non-Arab’ groups. Competition remains fierce over resources such as gold in the Jebel Mara and land that has become vacant because of the displacement of around 2 million people from Darfur.

The lack of a clear legal framework governing land ownership fuels the use of violence in the disputes between the various groups. This situation will be aggravated if the internally displaced were to return to Darfur.

These concerns have largely been ignored in the decisions over the fate of Darfur. This was illustrated by the referendum held in April 2016 on the area’s administrative status. Originally a federal state, Darfur had been divided into three states in 1994 and then into five states.

During the referendum, 97% of voters chose the ‘states option’ over the ‘regional option’. This meant that Darfur would remain divided into five states. The referendum was strongly criticised by many stakeholders and observers because of the security context, which did not allow internally displaced persons and refugees to participate. The organisation of this poll also raised questions about the government’s commitment to address the grievances that led to the current conflict.

The main ethnic groups, the Fur and the Zaghawa, also complained that the goal of these changes was to reduce their political weight while increasing the dominance of Arab tribes.

As the conflict in Darfur drags on, the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) remains the primary mediator trying to get a lasting peace deal. The main problem is the divergence among warring parties on how to settle the conflicts in Sudan. The rebel movements want a national process to address the root causes of instability such as governance, human rights and inclusivity. Yet they boycotted the National Dialogue organised by the government, which could have been a relevant forum to address these issues. They labelled it ‘a monologue’ without genuine exchange and denounced the lack of a neutral mediator.

Meanwhile, the government and some of its local allies wish to address each conflict – in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile (the so-called Two Areas) – separately.

It is still unclear how real the government’s commitment is to actually improve governance and open up the political space to include other actors than the ruling party. With the decreased presence of rebel movements in Darfur, it is unsure that an end to the 14-year conflict could be reached through the current talks mediated by the AU. The government may believe that its military superiority on the ground in Darfur negates any incentive to make concessions to rebel movements in such negotiations.

While the AUHIP could facilitate the signing of a roadmap to end both conflicts in Darfur and the Two Areas on 8 August 2016, it could not prevent the failure of the talks between the government, the Darfur rebel movements and the SPLM-N. The Darfur rebel groups refused to communicate their military positions to the government. At the same time, the SPLM-N could not agree with the government on the modalities of humanitarian access in the Two Areas, each side suspecting the other of instrumentalising aid.

Some of the rebel movements also have reservations about the neutrality of the head of the AUHIP, former South African president Thabo Mbeki. The continuous support of the AU to al Bashir in its feud with the International Criminal Court does impact perceptions of the AU’s mediation, in Darfur and elsewhere. Groups such as the SLM-AW do not even participate in the AU-led talks.

The AUHIP is struggling to create a context of confidence, as many rebel movements are suspicious of a government that has a history of breaking its commitments outlined in the various peace agreements. On the part of the government, it is unclear whether the military option has been totally ruled out.

It also remains to be seen how the fractured relations between communities in Darfur will be healed without common ground among the stakeholders on how to reform the governance system in the country.